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Hume on Motivation and Virtue

Edited by

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Preface and Acknowledgments

There must be mistakes that it is possible for an editor to make that I haven't made and misfortunes that can befall an editor that haven't befallen me, but if so, I am not anxious to make those mistakes or experience those misfortunes. So first of all, I would like to thank my contributors collectively, both for their work, and for their patience in putting up with a project that has taken such a *very* long time to come to fruition, partly because of my blunders. Some, who were just starting out in 2003, are now not only rising but *risen* stars, and I apologize to them in particular for occluding their sparkle for such a long time. As for my older contributors with plenty of publications to their credit, it is still a bit annoying to have some of that credit deferred, and I would like to apologize to them too. I was forced by reasons of space to omit a couple of papers I would have liked to have included. My apologies to those I have disappointed and inconvenienced. My thanks to Palgrave Macmillan for rescuing the project when it seemed about to fall through, and to my colleagues at Otago – particularly Peter Anstey and James Maclaurin for their judicious combination of nagging and encouragement. I would like to thank my research assistant Rebecca Thompson for her editorial services and the research cluster on Early Modern Thought at the University of Otago for providing the wherewithal to pay for them. Thanks to Annette Baier, Josh Parsons and Helen Beebee for useful discussions. Finally, my family. Even those bachelor philosophers of long ago – such as David Hume himself – were often heavily reliant on family support and I am not one of those bachelor philosophers. So thanks to my wife, Zena, my mother, Jean, and my (now grown-up) children, Guy Jemima and Abigail, for their love, help and encouragement.

- confused as to what she thought about liberalism, and thus not at all confident that I should disagree.
20. For Grice, the implicatum p is detachable from an utterance iff there are ways of saying the same thing that do not implicate p (see Grice 1989, p. 39). What Copp has in mind in saying that colourings are detachable is that instead of 'Aaron is a kike' one could say 'Aaron is Jewish', and the latter, though saying the same thing (having the same sense and reference?), lacks the implicatum that the speaker has contempt.
 21. Copp himself admits that 'nothing [in my argument] turns on whether coloring is an example of conventional implicature or simply a phenomenon that is similar to conventional implicature' (2001, p. 23).
 22. I actually harbour some reservations that Copp's view quite deserves the label 'realism', but the fact that it is a version of moral cognitivist 'success theory' is enough to underwrite the distinction I am highlighting. For my views on how to characterise *moral (anti)realism*, see Joyce, 2007a.
 23. Indeed, Mackie's general definition of 'good' is not a million miles away from the cognitivist element of morality articulated by Copp. Mackie defines 'good' as 'such as to satisfy requirements (etc.) of the kind in question' (1977, pp. 55–6). With many non-moral uses of 'good' Mackie thinks the predicate is satisfied. But in *moral* contexts, he thinks, the pertinent requirements are those that are 'simply there, in the nature of things, without being the requirements of any person or body of persons, even God' (p. 59). It is Mackie's conviction that there are no such 'intrinsic requirements' that lead to his moral scepticism.
 24. Mackie (1980) argues along similar lines to me for the error theoretic interpretation of Hume. David Gauthier (1992) also toys with this interpretation of Hume's account of the artificial virtues, though doesn't firmly endorse it.
 25. In saying this I am flying in the face of recent tradition, which tends to lump projectivism together with noncognitivism. I have argued elsewhere that this is at best optional and at worst a mistake. See Joyce, 2006 (Chapter 4) and Joyce (2009). In the latter, I delineate different species of projectivism.
 26. I discuss this impasse in Joyce, 2006 (Chapter 6), 2007a, and 2007b.
 27. David Lewis writes: 'Strictly speaking, Mackie is right: genuine values would have to meet an impossible condition, so it is an error to think there are any. Loosely speaking, the name may go to a claimant that deserves it imperfectly. ... What to make of the situation is mainly a matter of temperament' (1989, pp. 136–7).
 28. Early portions of this chapter closely follow Joyce, 2002. A youthful version of this essay once went by the name of 'Noncognitivism, Motivation, and Assertion', and it was helped along by feedback from David Lewis and Simon Kirchin. I thank David Copp for the very useful discussion.

2

Is Hume Inconsistent? – Motivation and Morals

Norva Y. S. Lo

2.1 Hume's Motivation Argument

Morality, Hume argues in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, cannot be 'deriv'd from reason alone.¹ Among his many arguments² for this anti-rationalist claim is what might be called the 'Motivation Argument'.³ He writes:

Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that morality, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. In order, therefore, to judge of these systems, we need only consider, whether it be possible, from reason alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur some other principles to enable us to make that distinction [...]

[M]orality is [...] supposed to influence our passions and actions [...]. And this is confirm'd by common experience, which informs us, that men are often govern'd by their duties, and are deter'd from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impell'd to others by that of obligation. Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone [...] can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. [...] An active principle can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances [...]

(T, 3.1.1.4–7/456–7. Cf. EPM, 1.7–9/172)

Accordingly, Hume's Motivation Argument can be formalized as follows:

- H1 Morality excites passions and motivates actions.
- H2 Reason alone cannot excite passions or motivate actions.
- H3 That which influences passions and actions cannot be derived merely from something which by itself cannot have such an influence.
- H4 Morality cannot be derived from reason alone. [from H1, H2 and H3]

Hume's argument is clearly valid. It is unclear, however, how we should read the argument in contemporary metaethical terms, which express finer distinctions apparently not discussed or made by Hume himself. In the passages where Hume articulates his Motivation Argument, he uses a variety of terms interchangeably with the term 'morality' – including 'opinion of injustice, and [...] that of obligation', 'rules of morality', 'moral good and evil',⁴ 'merit and demerit'⁵ and 'moral distinctions'.⁶ Hence, the major premise and the conclusion of Hume's Motivation Argument, both containing the ambiguous term 'morality', are open to multiple interpretations. When Hume says that 'morality is [...] supposed to influence our passions and actions', he can be interpreted as supposing (a) that *judgements* of moral good and evil have such an influence on us,⁷ and/or (b) that *knowledge* of moral good and evil has such an influence⁸ and/or (c) that the *properties* of moral good and evil themselves have such an influence⁹ – regardless of whether or not we make any judgement, or have any knowledge, about them. Given the ambiguity in Hume's terminology, all three readings seem plausible. The three different readings of Hume's motivation argument are formulated below.

The First Internalist Reading

- H1a *Judgments* of moral good and evil excite passions and motivate actions – that is, if we judge that ϕ -ing is virtuous/vicious, then (automatically) we feel a favourable/unfavourable sentiment towards ϕ -ing, and are motivated (though not necessarily overridingly) to pursue/avoid ϕ -ing.
- H2a Reasoning is a process which cannot by itself excite passions or motivate actions.
- H3a That which excites passions and motivates actions cannot be derived merely by processes which cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions.
- H4a Judgments of moral good and evil cannot be derived merely by reasoning. [from H1a, H2a and H3a]

The Second Internalist Reading

- H1b *Knowledge* of moral good and evil excites passions and motivates actions – that is, if we know that ϕ -ing is virtuous/vicious, then we

feel a favourable/unfavourable sentiment towards ϕ -ing, and are motivated to pursue/avoid ϕ -ing.

- H2b Reasoning is a process which cannot by itself excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H2a]
- H3b That which excites passions and motivates actions cannot be derived merely by processes which cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H3a]
- H4b Knowledge of moral good and evil cannot be derived merely by reasoning. [from H1b, H2b and H3b]

The Third Internalist Reading

- H1c *Properties* of moral good and evil excite passions and motivate actions – that is, if ϕ -ing has the property of being virtuous/vicious, then we feel a favourable/unfavourable sentiment towards ϕ -ing, and are motivated to pursue/avoid ϕ -ing.
- H2c Relations that are distinguishable¹⁰ simply by reasoning (for example, mathematical relations) cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions.
- H3c That which excites passions and motivates actions is not reducible to things that cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions.
- H4c Properties of moral good and evil are not reducible to relations that are distinguishable simply by reasoning. [from H1c, H2c and H3c]¹¹

These readings of Hume's Motivation Argument are not uncommon. Different versions of H1 have been taken to express different versions of *internalism*. The core idea of internalism is that morality is practical in that it has some necessary and internal connection to motivation. H1a expresses the version of internalism according to which there is an internal connection between one's making a moral judgement and one's being motivated to act accordingly; whereas according to the version of internalism represented by H1b, not all judgements about morals motivate, only the sound ones. H1c, however, expresses yet another form of internalism, the idea of which is that we are somehow attracted by the good and repelled by the evil. And so it is moral properties themselves that motivate us to act accordingly. Given these internalist interpretations of the major premise of his Motivation Argument, Hume is now very often considered as a precursor of internalism.¹²

Hume's Motivation Argument, as we have seen, is devised to disprove the general rationalist thesis that morality is derived from reason. The above three readings of Hume's anti-rationalist argument, however, show that the general rationalist thesis can be divided into two more specific claims – one about the *epistemology* of morals, another about the '*essence*'¹³

of morals. The first two versions of Hume's Motivation Argument both reject the rationalist epistemological claim that rational processes alone suffice to generate moral beliefs and knowledge, whereas the third version of the argument rejects the rationalist's analysis of good as essentially reducible to the 'conformity to reason' or 'truth' on the one hand, and evil as reducible to the 'contrariety to it' or 'falseness' on the other, which are relations¹⁴ distinguishable by mere reasoning (See T, 3.1.1.4/456, 9–15/458–61).

If Hume is right in rejecting the rationalist account of morality, then what are Hume's own answers to these two questions: First, are moral properties reducible to properties or relations of some other kind? Second, by what means, other than reasoning, do we arrive at judgements, and acquire knowledge, about moral good and evil? I shall answer these two questions in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively, by putting together Hume's own metaethical analysis of morals. In Section 2.4, I shall examine the above three internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument in the light of his own analysis of morals, and argue that all of them are, in one way or another, inconsistent with the analysis. In Section 2.5, I shall consider a possible defence of the internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument, which appeals to his view on cognitive but non-rational processes, such as observation and intuition. But I shall argue that the internalist readings of Hume are indefensible, and that Hume is not an internalist. Finally, I offer three *non*-internalist readings of Hume's argument, which are consistent with his analysis of morals and are also effective devices to disprove the kind of moral rationalism that he rejects.

2.2 Hume's analysis of morals

Consider the following two passages where Hume analyses the moral properties of vice and virtue, the first from the *Treatise of Human Nature*, the second from the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*.

[W]hen you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you *mean* nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.

(T, 3.1.1.26/468–9, emphasis added)¹⁵

The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains, that morality is determined by sentiment. It *defines* virtue to be *whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation*; and vice the contrary.

(EPM, approx. 1.10/173–5, first emphasis added, the rest original)

Accordingly, Hume's conceptual analysis, or definition, of 'virtue' and 'vice' can be reformulated as follows: an action or character is virtuous/vicious if and only if a 'spectator' feels the sentiment of approbation/disapprobation¹⁶

towards it. It is very important, however, to notice that what Hume calls a 'spectator' or 'judicious spectator' (T, 3.3.1.14/580–1) is not just anyone. Rather, Hume's spectator is a person who must meet a set of conditions. The first condition that Hume's spectator must satisfy is:

- C1 The condition of having *full knowledge and awareness* of all the circumstances and relations relevant to the case under evaluation.

As Hume puts it:

All the circumstances of the case are supposed to be laid before us, ere we can fix any sentence of blame or approbation. If any material circumstances be yet unknown or doubtful, we must first employ our enquiry or intellectual faculties to assure us of it; and must suspend for a time all moral decision or sentiment. [...] In moral decisions, *all the circumstances and relations must be previously known*; and the mind, from *the contemplation of the whole*, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame.

(EPM, approx. 1.11/175, emphasis added)

This doctrine will become still more evident, if we compare moral beauty with natural, to which, in many particulars, it bears so near a resemblance. [...] in all decisions of taste or external beauty, all the relations are before-hand obvious to the eye; and we thence proceed to feel a sentiment of complacency or disgust, according to the *nature* of the *object*, and *disposition* of our organs.

(EPM, approx. 1.13, emphases added. Cf. T, 3.1.2.3/471.)

Furthermore, in making moral decisions, Hume's 'judicious spectator' must adopt what he calls the 'steady and general points of view'. He writes:

[E]very particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis impossible we cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual *contradictions*, and arrive at a more *stable* judgment of things, we fix on some *steady* and *general points of view*; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation.

(T, 3.3.1.15/581–2, emphases original)

In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blam'd or prais'd, and according to the present disposition of our mind. But these variations we regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms

expressive of our liking and dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain'd in one point of view. Experience soon teaches us this method of *correcting our sentiments, or at least, correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable*. [...] Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses.

(T, 3.3.1.16/582 emphasis added. Cf. T, 3.3.1.21.)

We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one perform'd in our neighbourhood the other day: The *meaning* of which is, that we *know from reflection*, that the former action *wou'd* excite as strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, *were* it plac'd in the same position.

(T, 3.3.1.18/583–4, emphases added)

A case of 'correcting our sentiments, or at least, correcting our language', which Hume considers to be 'common with regard to all the senses' is that of making colour judgements under less than ideal conditions. A red object, for instance, may appear to have different colours under different circumstances – orangey at sunset, brownish on a dark night, and purplish at dawn. But an experienced spectator judges it to be red because she knows that if the same object *were* to be placed under normal daylight (the ideal condition for perceiving colours), then it *would* look red (Cf. T, 3.3.3.2/602–3 and Hume, 1760, p. 140). Similarly, in the case of making moral judgements, we might be in less than ideal positions so that our moral sentiments might not reliably indicate the presence of moral properties. For instance, as Hume points out, our sentiments are naturally stronger when the interests of ourselves or those who are close to us are at stake. So we may have a stronger feeling of disapproval towards the same evil behaviour or character when it causes harm to ourselves and our friends than when it causes harm to people who are complete strangers to us. But, according to Hume, in making sound moral judgements, we judge *not* according to our *actual* moral sentiments. Rather, we judge according to the moral sentiments that we believe we *would* have if we were to adopt the 'steady and general points of view' (the ideal perspective for perceiving moral properties). But what exactly is it for someone to adopt the so-called steady and general points of view? According to Hume, these points of view are 'general' and 'steady' in that people adopting such perspectives would overlook their own particular situations and interests, but focus instead on what is universal and common to all human beings, so that people adopting such perspectives could expect each other to converge in their moral sentiments and judgements. He writes:

'Tis [...] from the influence of characters and qualities, upon those who have an intercourse with any person, that we blame or praise him. We consider not the persons, affected by the qualities, be they our

acquaintance or strangers, countrymen or foreigners. Nay, we over-look our own interest in those general judgments; and blame not a man for opposing us in any of our pretensions, when his own interest is particularly concern'd. We make allowance for a certain degree of selfishness in men; because we know it to be inseparable from human nature, and inherent in our frame and constitution. By this reflection we correct those sentiments of blame, which so naturally arise upon any opposition.

(T, 3.3.1.17/582–3)

'Tis only when a character is consider'd in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil.

(T, 3.1.2.4)

In short, to adopt the 'steady and general points of view' is to meet all of the following conditions:

- C2 The condition of taking into account of facts about *human nature*.¹⁷
- C3 The condition of *overlooking one's personal interests*.
- C4 The condition of *overlooking one's personal relations* to the parties involved in the case under evaluation.

Given the above discussion on the conditions that Hume's 'judicious spectator' must satisfy, his analysis of virtue and vice can be expounded as follows:

- H An action¹⁸ or character is virtuous/vicious if and only if all human beings are disposed, under the conditions C1, C2, C3 and C4, to feel the sentiment of approbation/disapprobation towards it.¹⁹

Now, according to Hume, it is via *sympathy* that we form the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation towards social virtues and vices (for example, justice and injustice), respectively. Sympathy, in Hume's view, is a natural psychological mechanism of the human mind, by which the mind's thoughts of the sentiments of others (for example, my idea of another person's pleasure) can be converted into its own sentiments of the same kind (for example, my own feeling of pleasure).²⁰ For Hume, the psychological mechanism of sympathy causally explains our experience of moral sentiments, just as for a medical scientist, certain physiological mechanisms causally explain our experience of various bodily sensations (for example, the sensations of colour, smell, sound and heat). The reason not to include the proper functioning of sympathy as one of the ideal conditions for having reliable moral sentiments is as follows: (a) the operation of sympathy, in Hume's view, is based on two more basic psychological principles – namely,

the *association of ideas and impressions*²¹ and the *associated ideas and impressions sharing a similar degree of vivacity*,²² and (b) the proper functioning of these two psychological principles (and thus the proper functioning of sympathy) is, for Hume, part of the normal conditions of a human being, and (c) in general, dispositional analyses²³ (of which H is one) implicitly assume that the spectator satisfies the conditions that are normal for its kind. For instance, a dispositional analysis of colour often implicitly assumes the normal functioning of those organs or bodily parts of the observer that are causally responsible for her optical experiences. Likewise, a Humean dispositional analysis of moral qualities implicitly assumes the normal functioning of sympathy in the 'judicious spectator'.

It should be noted that H is a *humanist* as well as a *universalist* metaethical analysis of morality. It is humanist in that it understands value and disvalue as essentially anchored on the psychological dispositions of *human beings*, not that of God or any other superhuman beings. And it is universalist in that it implies that something is valuable/disvaluable only if *all* human beings are disposed under ideal conditions to approve/disapprove of it. On his universal humanism, Hume writes:

The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to *all mankind*, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it.

(EPM, 9.5/272–2, emphasis added)

When a man [...] bestows on any man the epithets of *vicious* or *odious* or *depraved*, he then [...] expresses sentiments, in which he expects *all* his audience are to concur with him.

(EPM, 9.6/272–3, last emphasis added, the rest original)

[T]he sentiments, which arise from humanity, are not only the same in all human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but they also comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one whose conduct or character is not, by their means, an object, to every one, of censure or approbation.

(EPM, 9.7/273)²⁴

It is perhaps his optimism in the uniformity of human nature (which is, after all, an empirical matter) that has led Hume to consider universality as a conceptual component of moral properties. Those Humeans who lack such an optimism (which is common for enlightenment thinkers) might want to hold a neutralized variation of Hume's analysis of morals, which says: Something is a *relative/universal* value (or disvalue) if and only if *some/all* human beings are disposed, under C1, C2, C3 and C4, to feel the

sentiment of approbation (or disapprobation) towards it. As we have seen, H is concerned only with identifying moral properties – for example, whether an action or character is or is not obligatory or virtuous. But even if we could identify all the values and obligations there are, we would still have the problem of how to balance them if they happened to be in conflict with each other. So, in the case of *comparing*²⁵ moral properties, Hume holds the following parallel analysis:

H* An action or character is *more/less* virtuous (or vicious) than another if and only if all human beings are disposed, under the conditions C1, C2, C3, C4, to feel a *stronger/weaker* sentiment of approbation (or disapprobation) towards one than towards another.

According to Hume, C1, C2, C3 and C4 are conditions under which our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation will reliably mark virtue and vice, respectively. The reference to these favourable conditions for reliable moral sentiments is crucial to Hume's analysis of morals. For that is what gives his otherwise subjective metaethics a certain degree of objectivism. Let me explain. Given H, a moral judgement is a judgement about the nature of the object under moral evaluation, as much as it is a judgement about the moral psychological dispositions of our mind – or, more precisely, it is, in Hume's words, about the 'relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind'.²⁶ An action or character is virtuous/vicious just in case it is naturally fitted to excite a favourable/unfavourable sentiment in us according to the dispositions and structures of our mind. Hence, the truth or falsity of a moral judgement is objective in the sense that it is not an arbitrary matter, but determined by the characteristic of the object under evaluation as well as by the facts of human evaluative psychologies. Furthermore, according to H, to say that something is virtuous is equivalent to saying that *if* we are/were in the *hypothetical* conditions C1, C2, C3 and C4, then we will/would feel the sentiment of approbation towards it. This allows the possibility that an action is virtuous without us actually feeling such a sentiment towards it. For it might be that we have not actually satisfied all those conditions favourable for having reliable moral sentiments. The lack of a positive sentiment from us towards the action does not imply that it is not virtuous. In other words, H allows the possibility that moral properties, such as virtue and vice, good and evil, can *exist* (that is, be instantiated) in the absence of valuers' matching evaluative responses. Or, more generally speaking, things can be (dis)valuable without being (dis)valued. In this sense, moral properties are said to be *ontologically objective*. But in another sense, moral properties are subjective under Hume's account. As we have seen, H is a conceptual analysis of virtue and vice in terms of the psychological dispositions of human subjects. If H is true, then the concepts 'virtue' and 'vice' cannot be correctly analysed without employing the concept 'subject'.

In other words, there is a necessary conceptual connection between moral properties and human subjects. In this sense, then, moral properties are said to be *conceptually subjective*.

In short, given Hume's analysis, facts about morals are nothing but *empirical* facts about the psychological dispositions of human beings to feel moral sentiments under certain hypothetical conditions. Moral properties are objective as well as subjective, but in ways compatible with, and indeed complementary to, each other. This is an advantage of Hume's theory, which can accommodate and account for the insights from both the objectivist and the subjectivist camps.

2.3 Hume's epistemology of morals

Hume's metaethics, as we have just seen, reduces facts of morals to the empirical facts of human psychology. This is an important part of Hume's wide-ranging naturalism, which presupposes nothing other than the things studied and investigated by the empirical sciences (broadly construed as to include psychology and various other social sciences). Hence, given H, the Humean *canonical method* of acquiring knowledge about morals is not mysterious, but empirical and potentially scientific.²⁷ For example, in order to decide whether someone's killing of another person is a vicious act, we need to go through the following procedures: (i) we need to get ourselves into condition C1, that is, we need to gather all the information about the circumstances under which the action is performed and the relations between the actor and the other people involved, such as what the motive behind the action is, whether it was an accident, or whether it is a case of self-defence, what personal histories and relations the killer and the victim have, and so on. And (ii) we need to get ourselves into condition C2, that is, we take into account the facts of human nature. For instance, in cases where the killer has a history of suffering from long-term physical and psychological abuses, we pay attention to the fact that it is part of the human condition that people sometimes lose sensitivity and sanity in a traumatic environment. Furthermore, (iii) we need to get ourselves into condition C3, that is, we try to overlook our self-interests. For instance, in cases where the victim is our benefactor so that we suffer a material loss due to her death, we pretend as hard as possible that our interests are not at stake. And (iv) we need to get ourselves into condition C4, that is, we try to overlook our personal relations. For instance, in cases where the killer is a friend of ours, we pretend as hard as possible that the killer was a stranger instead.

Now, suppose we have got ourselves into all these conditions, C1, C2, C3 and C4, which are favourable for having reliable moral sentiments. Then, while we are still under these condition, (v) we proceed to feel what sentiments we have towards the action under evaluation. The better we get ourselves into C1, C2, C3 and C4, the better indicators of moral properties our

subsequent moral sentiments will be. If we could get ourselves completely into those conditions, then, according to H, our subsequent moral sentiments would be infallible indicators: our positive sentiments of approbation, delight and esteem would indicate virtue; whereas our negative sentiments would indicate vice. It is unlikely that we will completely satisfy those conditions ideal for having reliable sentiments. So we approximate the test and get less than ideal but approximate results. We also try to improve the test by trying harder to meet those ideal conditions. This is how we make progress in our knowledge about morals. Hume's metaethical account of morals, like many other dispositional theories of values nowadays, 'makes a place for truth, and in principle for certain knowledge, and in practice for less-than-certain knowledge about value. But also it makes a place for ignorance and error, for hesitant opinion and modesty, for trying to learn more and hoping to succeed' (Lewis, 1989, p. 123).

Now, let us consider again the five processes that we need to go through in order to identify or compare the moral properties of actions or characters. Processes (i) and (ii) are both *cognitive*, in that they aim at delivering a complete true description of the object under moral evaluation, namely: a certain action performed by (or a certain character of) a being of a certain nature. Processes (iii) and (iv), however, are partly *imaginative*, in that they require us to actively entertain thoughts that we know to be not completely true: we pretend that our private interests are not at stake, and that people involved are strangers to us. Finally, process (v) is *purely emotive and subjective*, in that we simply let ourselves experience the subjective properties of the sentiments that we have towards the object under moral evaluation: at this point, no judgement is made, and no descriptive thought is entertained. It is a process of forming emotions, not beliefs or make-beliefs. According to Hume, the first four steps in our inquiry of morals are merely preparatory – they prepare us for the reliability of our subsequent sentiments as indicators of moral properties. It is not until we engage ourselves in the final, emotive process, in which we feel the sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, that we can tell whether the object under evaluation is good or evil. On the necessity of experiencing moral sentiments in our making judgements about morals, Hume writes:

Take any action allow'd to be vicious. [...] The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, *till* you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a *sentiment* of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the *object of feeling*, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.

(T, 3.1.1.26/468–9, first emphasis original, all others added)²⁸

If any material circumstances be yet unknown or doubtful, we must first employ our enquiry or intellectual faculties to assure us of it; and must suspend for a time all moral decision or sentiment. [...] But after every

circumstance, every relation is known, *the understanding has no further room to operate*. [...] The approbation or blame, which then ensues, cannot be the work of judgment, but of the *heart*; and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment. In the disquisitions of understanding, from known circumstances and relations, we *infer* some new and unknown. In moral decisions, all the circumstances and relations must be previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, *feels* some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame.

(EPM, approx. 1.11/175, emphasis added)²⁹

In short, under Hume's canonical method, which is warranted by H and H*, the final *non-rational* process of feeling moral sentiments is a *necessary* step in acquiring knowledge, or making approximate judgements, about moral good and evil, virtue and vice. In short, if we only employ Hume's canonical method in our moral inquiry, then it is true to say that judgements and knowledge of moral good and evil cannot be derived merely by reasoning (that is, H4a and H4b).

2.4 The split between judgement and sentiment

Reasoning, on Hume's view, is essentially a process of making inferences – to reason is simply to infer something unknown from something already known or presupposed.³⁰ According to Hume, there are only 'two kinds'³¹ of reasoning, namely: 'demonstrative' (that is, deductive) reasoning and 'probable' (that is, inductive) reasoning (T, 1.3.1/455; 1.3.2–6/73–92). By demonstrative reasoning, we infer previously unknown 'abstract relations of ideas' (that is, conceptual relations: T, 2.3.3.2/413). By probable reasoning, we infer previously unknown 'real existence or the relations of objects' (that is, cause or effect, or causal relation between them: T, 1.3.2.2/73–4). Now, consider the following argument, which is a combination of demonstrative and probable reasonings.

- P1 For all the people whom I have observed from all walks of life, if (i) they believe that an action of type ϕ has been performed by a person under the circumstances of type S, (ii) they take into account facts of human nature, (iii) their interests are not at stake, and (iv) none of their acquaintances are involved, then (v) they feel the sentiment of disapprobation towards the action. [empirical observation]
- P2 My friend's attack on my enemy is an action of type ϕ performed under the circumstance of type S. [empirical observation]
- P3 For all human beings, they are disposed, under the Humean ideal conditions C1, C2, C3, C4, to feel the sentiment of disapprobation

towards my friend's attack on my enemy. [from P1 and P2, by *probable reasoning*]

- P4 An action or character is virtuous/vicious if and only if all human beings are disposed, under the conditions C1, C2, C3 and C4, to feel the sentiment of approbation/disapprobation towards it. [H, Hume's conceptual analysis of morals]
- P5 My friend's attack on my enemy is vicious. [from P3 and P4, by *demonstrative reasoning*]

This argument is inductively as well as deductively valid. It (its premise P4) endorses Hume's analysis of morals (that is, H), and delivers a moral conclusion.³² Hume himself never discussed acquiring moral knowledge by arguments similar to the one above. Nonetheless, his analysis of morals allows this way of gaining moral knowledge. Now, this is a bad news for the internalist readings of Hume. For, contrary to the first and second internalist readings of the conclusion of his Motivation Argument (that is, H4a and H4b), the above argument derives a moral conclusion purely by probable and demonstrative reasonings. Furthermore, contrary to those internalist readings of the major premise of Hume's Motivation Argument (that is, H1a and H1b), the above argument shows that it is possible for someone to arrive at a moral conclusion without feeling any matching moral sentiment, and thus without being motivated to behave morally. For example, suppose by running the above argument, I arrive at the negative moral conclusion on my friend's attack on my enemy. Despite my unfavourable judgement, it is possible that I might not feel any negative moral sentiment towards my friend's behaviour. This is because I might not be in the ideal conditions C3 and C4, and so I might not be impartial, when I contemplate upon what my friend has done. Worse still, I might even delight in my friend's behaviour due to my dislike of the victim. Here, we have a case of the split between judgement and sentiment – rationally one might judge something to be vicious, but emotionally one might feel no unfavourable moral sentiment towards it. Moreover, that such a divide is possible is a logical consequence of Hume's analysis of morals, which reduces facts about good and evil to empirical facts about human psychological dispositions, which can be studied from the detached perspective of an onlooker.

In short, if H is true, then H1a and H1b are both false. H1c is also false under H. For given H, if something is virtuous/vicious, then we are disposed under conditions C1, C2, C3 and C4 to feel the sentiment of approbation/disapprobation towards it. If we are more or less under those conditions, then we will more or less feel those favourable/unfavourable moral sentiments towards it. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that we will satisfy all those conditions, and thus no guarantee that we will feel the corresponding moral sentiments or be motivated to act accordingly. Thus, moral properties themselves have no more reliable influence on our passions and actions than our judgements or knowledge of them.

How exactly does the split between judgement and sentiment come about? It has nothing to do with whether the judgement is correct. For a split between moral knowledge and moral sentiment is just as likely. Some might argue that such a split is due to the person not *really* endorsing the judgement. In other words, someone does not really judge something to be virtuous/vicious unless she feels a positive/negative sentiment towards that thing. But this way of thinking about the problem is not helpful. For isn't a so-called real moral judgement (or a real endorsement of it) simply the judgement accompanied by a matching sentiment? If a real moral judgement is simply that, then it becomes a trivial truism to say that the divide between judgement and sentiment is due to a lack of real endorsement – there is a split between my judgement and my sentiment because my judgement is not accompanied by a suitable sentiment! Rather, the occasional split between our moral judgements and sentiments is to be explained in terms of *how we arrive at those judgements*. Consider again the above case of my friend's attack on my enemy. Why do I have a negative judgement of my friend and yet fail to feel a corresponding negative sentiment towards him? The answer is: because in making such a moral judgement, I did not use the Humean canonical method, which requires the experience of moral sentiments as an essential step – that is, because I have arrived at the judgement by completely non-affective means. That is equivalent to the case of a purely rational being, incapable of any feelings, arriving at the same moral conclusion by running the same argument above. This being, a perfect observer and moral judge though it might be, could never feel the moral sentiment that is required to motivate a corresponding action from a human being. The Humean canonical method of making moral judgement and acquiring moral knowledge, though certified by Hume's conceptual analysis of morals, is not the only method available. There is the participant's way of finding out facts of morals; but there is also the onlooker's way – both compatible with H.

In short, there are two conclusions to be drawn: (1) The major premises in the three internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument (namely: H1a, H1b and H1c) are all incompatible with his own analysis of morals (that is, H). Neither do we always form emotions, nor are we always motivated to act, according to our judgements, knowledge, or the facts, of moral properties. (2) The anti-rationalist conclusions in the three internalist readings of Hume's argument (namely: H4a, H4b and H4c) also turn out to be all false under Hume's analysis of morals. For Hume's analysis warrants the onlooker's method of making judgements, and acquiring knowledge, about good and evil. And this method, as we have seen, demonstrates that moral judgements and knowledge can indeed be derived (in the sense of 'inferred')³³ simply by reasoning. For similar reasons, moral properties also turn out to be reducible to relations that are distinguishable by reasoning – namely, the empirical relations between different objects under evaluation

and our different psychological dispositions to react emotionally towards them, which are distinguishable by probable reasoning.

2.5 Reasoning and other cognitive processes

It can be argued, however, that when Hume concludes that morality cannot be 'deriv'd' from reason alone, what he means is that our judgements or knowledge about morals cannot be *the product of* mere reasoning.³⁴ Why not? Because even if we employ the onlooker's method to acquire moral knowledge or make approximate moral judgements, which involves no exercise of the emotions, we still need to do more than just reasoning. Namely: we need to *observe*. For example, both premises P1 and P2 in the onlooker's argument are the results of empirical observation, without which we would not arrive at the conclusion of the argument. Observation, however, does not belong to the province of reason. For it involves no inference making, and is in Hume's view 'a mere passive admission of the impressions thro' the organs of the sensation' (T, 1.3.2.2/73). Whether we use the onlooker's method or the Humean canonical method (that is, the participant's method) in our moral inquiry, the non-rational procedure of observation is indispensable. Hence, those who want to defend the internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument can argue that it is after all correct for a Humean to hold H4a and H4b, the anti-rationalist conclusion that moral judgements and knowledge cannot be 'deriv'd' by (that is, the product of) mere reasoning. Similarly, the defenders of the internalist readings might argue that it is correct for a Humean to hold H4c, the anti-rationalist conclusion that moral properties cannot be reduced to relations that are distinguishable by mere reasoning. For non-rational observation is needed before we can distinguish the different empirical relations (between objects and our dispositions to react emotionally towards them) which, according to H, constitute different moral properties.

I do not think that the above defence can save the internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument. First of all, we have seen that a core problem with the three internalist versions of Hume's argument is that their major premises (that is, H1a, H1b and H1c) are all inconsistent with Hume's own analysis of morals (that is, H). But the above defence of the internalist interpretations does not address this problem at all.

Second, it follows from the above defence that strictly speaking, reasoning cannot by itself produce knowledge of *any* kind at all. For even a priori knowledge, such as that of logic and mathematics, still requires the exercise of non-inferential 'intuition' (for example, the intuition of the principle of excluded middle, and the intuition that 2 is less than 5), which, according to Hume, is not reasoning because it involves no inference making but merely 'discover[y] at first sight' (T, 1.3.1.2/70). Thus, the above defence can save (the three versions of) the conclusion of Hume's Motivation Argument only

at the cost of making them almost trivially true – reasoning by itself could not produce knowledge or sound judgements about morals simply because reasoning by itself could not produce any knowledge or judgement whatsoever; likewise, moral properties cannot be reduced to relations that are distinguishable by mere reasoning simply because no relations whatsoever can be distinguished by mere reasoning. If the anti-rationalist conclusion of Hume's Motivation Argument were to be defended in this way, then the point about motivation would be completely lost – all the three premises in the Motivation Argument would become redundant. So, if we are to defend Hume's whole argument, not just its conclusion considered in isolation, then we'd better keep the focus on the relation between motivation and morality, and the difference between passion and reason in terms of their relation or non-relation to motivation.

Third, when Hume refers to the rational process of reasoning in the course of giving his Motivation Argument, his points about reasoning seem to apply to all cognitive processes, understood as the 'discovery of truth or falsehood', of which reasoning is just one particular case. For example, he writes:

Reason is the *discovery of truth or falsehood*. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason.

(T, 3.1.1.9/458, emphases added)

This argument [...] proves [...] that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence.

(T, 3.1.1.10/458)

It is clear that this argument from Hume can be readily extended to cover *cognition* in general, which includes the non-rational processes of observation and intuition. The extended argument will look exactly the same as the original one save that the term 'reason' is uniformly replaced by 'cognition'. For example, instead of saying 'reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood,' the extended argument says 'cognition is the discovery of truth or falsehood.' And instead of saying 'reason can never immediately prevent

or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it,' the extended argument says 'cognition can never immediately prevent or produce any action ...', and so on, and so on.

Fourth, Hume himself needs to extend his point on the inertness of reason to that of cognition. For he argues that 'since vice and virtue are *not* discoverable merely by *reason*, ... it must be by means of some ... *sentiment* they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them' (T, 3.1.2.1/470, emphases added). But Hume himself recognizes operations of our mind, such as observation and intuition, which are neither the rational process of reasoning nor the emotive process of experiencing sentiments. So, in order not to commit the fallacy of false alternatives when he argues from 'not ... reason' to 'sentiment', he needs an extra premise which says that those other operations, such as observation and intuition, cannot by themselves distinguish good and evil. But how can he justify this extra premise? – obviously, by extending his Motivation Argument to cover cognition in general, not just reasoning.

For the reasons given above, when Hume says 'vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason,' I read him as meaning, or at least implying, that moral properties are not discoverable merely by *cognitive* processes. Accordingly, the best we can do for the three internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument is to modify them in the following manner:

The First Modified Internalist Reading

- H1a Judgments of moral good and evil excite passions and motivate actions.
- H2a* Cognitive processes (for example, reasoning, observation and intuition) cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions.
- H3a* That which excites passions and motivates actions cannot be merely the product of processes which cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions.
- H4a* Judgments of moral good and evil cannot be merely the product of cognitive processes. [from H1a, H2a* and H3a*]

The Second Modified Internalist Reading

- H1b Knowledge of moral good and evil excites passions and motivates actions.
- H2b* Cognitive processes cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H2a*]
- H3b* That which excites passions and motivates actions cannot be merely the product of processes which cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H3a*]
- H4b* Knowledge of moral good and evil cannot be merely the product of cognitive processes. [from H1b, H2b* and H3b*]

The Third Modified Internalist Reading

- H1c Properties of moral good and evil excite passions and motivate actions.
- H2c* Relations that are distinguishable simply by cognitive processes (for example, mathematical relations and causal relations) cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions.
- H3c That which excites passions and motivates actions is not reducible to things that cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions.
- H4c* Properties of moral good and evil are not reducible to relations that are distinguishable simply by cognitive processes. [from H1c, H2c* and H3c]

Note that the above modifications keep the anti-rationalist aspects of Hume's Motivation Argument. This is because reasoning is one kind of cognitive process, and therefore the modified conclusions, H4a*, H4b* and H4c* (which express the idea that morality cannot be derived from cognition alone), entail the original anti-rationalist conclusions, H4a, H4b and H4c (which express the idea that morality cannot be derived from reason alone). This is, I believe, the best way that the internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument can take into account his view on cognitive but non-rational mental processes.

Unfortunately, however, the core problem with the three internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument still remains. The major premises in the modified versions are still the same as before (that is, H1a, H1b and H1c). They all assert some necessary connection between morality and motivation. But, as we have seen, that is inconsistent with Hume's own conceptual analysis of morality (that is, H), which allows the possibilities that people can make judgements and have knowledge about morals without automatically experiencing any matching sentiments and thus without being motivated to act accordingly, and similarly that things can have the property of being morally good or evil without people reacting appropriately towards them. Moreover, contrary to the conclusions in the three modified internalist readings (that is, H4a, H4b and H4c), people can indeed make judgements and acquire knowledge about morals by purely cognitive means, as the onlooker's method (which is warranted by H) has demonstrated, and therefore the properties of good and evil are indeed reducible to relations distinguishable purely by cognition. In short, if Hume's analysis of morals is correct, then all three modified internalist readings of Hume's Motivation Argument (like the unmodified ones) are unsound.

If Hume is to be consistent, then he had better not hold any necessary connection between morality and motivation. Contrary to the prevailing view, I do not think that Hume holds any such internalist connection. After all, he himself says: "Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform

the will to it' (T, 3.1.1.22/465–6). And, although he argues that we should judge morality by reflecting on how we would feel under the conditions ideal for having reliable moral sentiments, he also acknowledges that the sentiments that we actually feel in our actual situations can be too 'stubborn and inalterable' to match our considered judgements, so that the considerations of our ideal sentiments under the ideal conditions may merely help in 'correcting our language', but not correcting our subjective sentiments.^{35,36} 'The passions', he says, 'do not always follow our corrections' of moral language (T, 3.3.1.21/585). Clearly, Hume is aware of the possible divide between morals and motivation. For these reasons, we should be suspicious of any internalist reading of Hume. Then, what are the best readings of Hume's Motivation Argument? I shall conclude this article with the following three non-internalist interpretations, which, I believe, are not far from what Hume had in mind.

The First Non-Internalist Reading

- H1d Some (but not all) moral judgements and pieces of moral knowledge excite passions and motivate actions.
- H2d Cognitive processes cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H2a*]
- H3d That which excites passions and motivates actions cannot be purely the product of processes which cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H3a*]
- H4d Some moral judgements and pieces of moral knowledge (namely those that excite passions and motivate actions) cannot be purely the product of cognitive processes. [from H1d, H2d, H3d and H4d]
- H5 Some moral judgements and pieces of moral knowledge cannot be purely the product of reasoning (which is a cognitive process). [from H4d]
- H6 The epistemological claim of moral rationalism is that moral knowledge is purely the product of reasoning (which is a cognitive process).
- H7 *The epistemological claim of moral rationalism is false.* [from H5 and H6]

The Second Non-Internalist Reading

- H1e The internalist claim of moral rationalism is that moral knowledge always excites passions and motivates actions.
- H2e Cognitive processes (for example, reasoning) cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H2a*]
- H3e That which excites passions and motivates actions cannot be purely the product of processes which cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H3a*]

- H4e The internalist claim of moral rationalism requires that moral knowledge cannot be purely the product of cognitive processes (for example, reasoning). [from H1e, H2e and H3e]
- H6 The epistemological claim of moral rationalism is that moral knowledge is purely the product of reasoning (which is a cognitive process).
- H8 *Moral rationalism is an inconsistent position* in that either its *internalist claim* or its *epistemological claim* is false. [from H4e and H6]

The Third Non-Internalist Reading

- H1e The internalist claim of moral rationalism is that moral knowledge always excites passions and motivates actions.
- H2e Cognitive processes (for example, reasoning) cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H2a*]
- H3e That which excites passions and motivates actions cannot be purely the product of processes which cannot by themselves excite passions or motivate actions. [same as H3a*]
- H4e The internalist claim of moral rationalism requires that moral knowledge cannot be purely the product of cognitive processes (for example, reasoning). [from H1e, H2e and H3e]
- H9 The analysis of the essence of morals given by moral rationalism reduces moral good and evil to the conformity to reason and the contrariety to it, respectively, which can be known purely by reasoning.
- H10 *Moral rationalism is an inconsistent position* in that either its *internalist claim* or its *analysis of the essence of morals* is false. [from H4e and H9]

Consider the three non-internalist reading of Hume in turn. The first one shows that Hume's Motivation Argument can validly reject moral rationalism without its major premise (that is, H1) being given an internalist reading. The second and third readings both show that it is moral rationalism which endorses internalism, and that Hume's Motivation Argument validly rejects moral rationalism by showing that its internalism is inconsistent with its other theoretical commitments.

In conclusion, Hume is *not* an internalist, and he is not inconsistent. It is the internalist readings of Hume that are inconsistent with his analysis of morals.

Notes

1. See T, 3.1.1/455, which is entitled 'Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason'.
2. See T, 3.1.1/455, and the editors' summary of Hume's various arguments in Norton and Norton (2000, pp. 176–8).

3. According to Sayre-McCord (1997), Rachel Cohon and David Owen use the term 'Motivation Argument' in their 'Hume on Representation, Reason and Motivation' which was delivered at the University of Nottingham at the 1996 meeting of the International Hume Society.
4. See T, 3.1.1.10/458, where Hume writes: 'as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of *moral good and evil*, which are found to have that influence' (emphasis added).
5. See T, 3.1.1.10/458, where Hume writes: 'The *merit and demerit* of actions frequently contradict, and sometimes controul our natural propensities. But reason has no such influence. *Moral distinctions*, therefore, are not the offspring of reason' (emphasis added).
6. See n. 5 above. Also see T, 3.1.1.16/462–3, where Hume writes: 'tis impossible, that the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, can be made by reason; since *that distinction has an influence upon our actions*, of which reason alone is incapable' (emphasis added).
7. Hume (T, 3.1.1.2/456) uses the phrase 'those *judgments*, by which we distinguish moral good and evil' (emphasis added).
8. Hume (T, 3.1.1.22/465–6) discusses *knowledge* of virtue and vice and its influence on the will.
9. Hume (T, 3.1.1.4/456–7) speaks of 'measures of right and wrong' as 'impos[ing] an obligation' on rational beings.
10. See T, 3.1.1.19/463–4, n. 69, where Hume attributes to the rationalists who assert that 'morality is demonstrable' an implicit argument 'that morality lies in the relations, and that the relations are *distinguishable by reason*' (emphasis added).
11. See T, 3.1.1.4/456, 19/463, n. 69, 21–3/464–6, where Hume rejects the rationalist claim that moral properties *consist* of relations that can be inferred by reasoning. See T, 3.1.1.22–3/465–6, which can be interpreted as supportive of the third reading of Hume's Motivation Argument.
12. In the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Wallace (1998, pp. 522–3) says, 'David Hume is presumably giving voice to an internalist point of view when he makes central to his theory the idea that "morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions."' For various internalist readings of Hume, see Harrison (1976), Foot (1978), Mackie (1980), Brown (1988), Coleman (1992), Dimock (1992), Radcliffe (1996), Bricke (1996), Sayre-McCord (1997) and Liu (2003).
13. For Hume's discussion of the rationalist thesis concerning the 'essence' of morality, see T, 3.1.1.4/456–7, 13/460, 15/461, n. 68, 19/463–4, 25/467–8.
14. 'Truth or falsehood', according to T, 3.1.1.9/458, 'consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact'. Both of these, like 'conformity to reason' and 'contrariety to it', are regarded by Hume (T, 3.1.1.18–26/463–9) as relations distinguishable by reason.
15. Also see T, 3.3.1.3/574–5, where Hume writes: 'we ... may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility'. On his view, pride/humility is a certain pleasant/painful sentiment that we feel towards ourselves when we experience or contemplate upon some agreeable/disagreeable qualities of ourselves. That is why Hume writes: 'everything related to us, which produces pleasures or pain, produces likewise pride or humility' (T, 2.1.6.3/291, emphasis removed; see also T, 2.1.7.8/297–8), and '[t]o approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness. The pain and

- pleasure, therefore, being the primary causes of vice and virtue, must also be the causes of all their effects, and consequently of pride and humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of this distinction' (T, 2.1.7.5/296). Hume's treatment of love and hatred is similar to his treatment of pride and humility. The difference is only that while pride and humility are directed to oneself, love and hatred are feelings directed to some other person (see T, 2.2.1/275).
16. According to Hume (T, 3.1.2.2-6/470-3, 11/475), the sentiment of approbation is a 'pleasing sentiment', and disapprobation the contrary. Furthermore, Hume (T, 1.3.10.2/118-9; 2.1.1.4/276-7; 2.1.10.8/314; 2.3.3.3/414; 2.3.9.1/438; 3.3.1.2/574, and EPM, approx. 1.21/141) maintains that we naturally desire what pleases us and are repelled by what brings us pain. It follows that the moral sentiments can excite desires and thus to some extent motivate moral behaviour (Cf. EPM, approx. 1.3/170).
 17. For example, Hume considers the following features as ingredients of human nature: regard to self-interest or, what Hume sometimes calls, 'selfishness' (T, 3.2.2.16/494), 'limited generosity' (T, 3.2.2.16/494), a tendency to 'overlook' the value of things, 'to which we have been long accustomed' (T, 2.1.6.3/291).
 18. According to Hume (T, 3.2.1.2-8/477-9), an action is virtuous/vicious only if it is the product of a virtuous/vicious 'motive or principle'. Hence, in the case of evaluating an action, condition C1 requires that the spectator is aware of the motive or principle, from which the action was produced.
 19. For other examples of realist readings of Hume, see Firth (1952), Wiggins (1987), Sayre-McCord (1994). The realist readings of Hume are not currently dominant. It will take another occasion to defend that reading that I advocate in this essay against its various rivals. For instances of different anti-realist readings of Hume, see Hunter (1962), Flew (1963), Mackie (1980), Ayer (1980) and Blackburn (1984 and 1998a).
 20. For Hume's account of sympathy, see T, 1.1.1.1-7/1-4; 1.1.2-3/7-9; 1.1.4.1-2/10-11; 1.3.6.13/92-3; 1.3.8.2/98-9; 1.3.10.3/119-20; 1.3.14.28/168-9; 1.3.15.1, 5/173; 1.4.6.4; 2.1.4.2/252-3; 2.1.11.4-8/317-20; 2.2.4.7/354; 3.3.1.7/575.
 21. According to this Humean psychological principle, it is a natural propensity of the mind to associate the impression or idea of any thing with the idea of any other thing, where the two things are related to each other by causation, resemblance, and/or contiguity in time and place. See T, 1.3.6.13/92-3. Cf. T, 1.1.4.1-2/10-11, 2.1.4.2/283.
 22. This Humean psychological principle says that it is a natural propensity of the mind to communicate a share of the force and vivacity of any present impression to such ideas as are associated with it. See T, 1.3.8.2/98-9.
 23. The general form is dispositional analyses of value which is as follows: X is valuable/disvaluable if and only if valuers are disposed, under certain conditions, to have a favourable/unfavourable response towards X.
 24. See EPM (5.46/231-2) where Hume understands 'humanity' as 'a concern for others' regardless of our personal interests and relations. Also see EPM (2.5/177-8) where he takes 'humanity' to be a virtue that 'proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and species'. Cf. EPM, 5.18/220.
 25. Hume (T, 3.3.1.21/585) talks of the 'degrees of vice and virtue'. Also see, for example, T, 3.1.1.13/460; 3.3.4.10/611, where Hume takes virtue and vice as admitting of degrees. Likewise, Hume (EPM, approx. 1.11/175) talks about some moral duty and obligation as 'superior'. See Hume (1741) for a discussion on cultivating our abilities (which Hume calls 'taste') to make finer distinctions and comparisons of moral and aesthetic properties.
 26. Hume (1760, p. 136). Also see n. 19 above.
 27. See EPM, approx. 1.10/173, where after putting forward his conceptual analysis of morals, he says: 'We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence [on the sentiments of the judicious "spectator"]: We endeavour to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments' (emphasis added).
 28. Also see Ardal, 1966. And see Lo, 2001 for a discussion of the operation of Humean sympathy in the production of moral sentiments in the case of the virtue of justice and the vice of injustice.
 29. Also see EPM, approx. 1.12/13.
 30. See T, 1.3.1.2/70; 1.3.2.2/73; 1.3.3.6/81. Also see Owen, 1999, ch. 5.
 31. See T, 3.1.1.18/463, where Hume writes: 'the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact; [...] nor is there any third operation of the understanding.'
 32. The inference from P3 and P4 to P5 is an example of a 'deduction' from 'is' to 'ought', about which Hume (T, 3.1.1.27/469) says 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and *explain'd*; and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what *seems* altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it' (emphases added). The Humean explanation for the deduction from 'is' to 'ought' is that Hume's conceptual analysis of morals, H, is a bridging principle linking 'ought' (the LHS of H) to 'is' (the RHS of H). For a debate on whether Hume holds a gap between 'is' and 'ought', see Hudson, 1969.
 33. See, for example, T, 3.1.1.6/457, where he appears to use the term 'deriv'd' in the sense of 'inferred'.
 34. See, for example, T, 3.1.1.24/466; 3.1.2.6/473; 3.2.1.6/478, 9/479, 17/483; 3.2.2.9/489, 18/495, 20/496, 23/498; 3.2.3.7/506; 3.2.6.9-10/531-3, where Hume appears to use the term 'deriv'd' in the sense of 'the product of'.
 35. See n. 20 above.
 36. For Hume's own examples of 'correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable', see T, 3.3.1.16/582, 18/583, 21/585.